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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of CEO Turnover using a sample of UK non-financial firms that 
announced top management changes during 1993-2000. It is found that poor performance and high financial 
leverage preceded forced CEO Turnover, and there is no significant evidence that there was poor performance 
or high financial leverage prior to normal CEO Turnover. It is also found that managerial ownership is 
significantly negative related to the likelihood of forced CEO Turnover. There is also evidence that the market 
for corporate control plays a significant role in CEO Turnover.  
Keywords: CEO Turnover; Top Management Changes; Poor Performance; High Financial Leverage; 
Managerial Ownership; Corporate Control. 
1. Introduction 
Despite considerable research on the cause of top management changes, the factors that potentially lead to CEO 
Turnover have not been exhaustively investigated. For example, there is scanty evidence that control 
mechanisms play a big role on disciplining poorly performing managers.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Reference [1] asserts that the controlling mechanisms are mainly done by the external systems. This finding is in 
contrast with that of [2] who do not find a relation between turnover rates and levels of external control 
mechanisms. 
 Much of the previous literature finds that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively related to 
firm performance [3]. This relationship is significant to firms that experienced forced CEO Turnover. The 
removal of a poorly performing manager is considered as a remedial action intended to make sure that 
management’s behaviour is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. However, the literature does not 
offer a complete story whether there is any significant relationship between performance and normal CEO 
Turnover.  
Another strand of literature finds that managerial turnover is more prevalent in financially distressed firms [4]. 
The act of default or the need to renegotiate debt claims confers significant decision-making power on the firm’s 
creditors, who can possibly further their own interests by choosing new management. [5] suggests that creditors 
may have greater incentives than shareholders to monitor and change management in exchange for new loans or 
the restructuring of existing loans.  
Prior studies also provide evidence that suggests that poor performance increases the likelihood of a firm 
becoming the target of a takeover attempt [6]. Indeed, [7] observe that the relation between firm performance 
and CEO Turnover is weaker during periods when the threat of takeover is low. By contrast, Reference [2] do 
not find a relation between turnover rates and levels of takeover activity.  
In recent years, a lot of literature has examined the role of control mechanisms on disciplining poorly 
performing managers. The available evidence partly suggests that the external control mechanisms are not as 
effective as they are supposed to be. The internal control mechanisms are also considered blunt due to: first, 
managerial entrenchment [8]; second, if a board is dominated by security holders, and looking at the market for 
risk bearing from the viewpoint of portfolio theory tells us that risk bearers are likely to spread their wealth 
across many firms and so would not be interested in directly controlling the management of any individual firm 
[9]; and finally, boards of directors react too late, and take too long to effect major changes [10]. 
This paper contributes to the body of knowledge that examines the causes of top management changes by re-
examining the determinants of CEO Turnover using a sample of UK non-financial firms over the period 1993 – 
2000. Specifically, the paper is attempting to answer the following questions: what are the major factors that 
potentially lead to CEO Turnover? Are control mechanisms effective enough on disciplining poorly performing 
corporate managers?  
Most of the evidence on CEO Turnover is based on studies conducted in the US. The literature on other markets 
has lagged behind corresponding US studies. For example, while the UK and US corporate environments are 
characterized by market-based institutions, important institutional1 differences do exist [11]. First, the ability of 
external shareholders in the US, particularly institutions, to co-ordinate effective corporate governance action is 
                                                 
1 Examples of these institutions are: pension funds, insurance companies, banks, and investment companies. 
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severely constrained by legal and regulatory restrictions, while far fewer restrictions are placed in the UK. 
Second, the US institutions are deterred from coalition practices. They are required to disclose formation of any 
shareholding group – formal or informal, owning 5% or more stock. In contrast, UK institutions are not faced 
with such restrictions – they can form informal coalition, and jointly monitor firms and/or managers. In general, 
UK institutions are thought to be more active than their US counterparts [12]. Third, the US corporate 
managements are largely protected from external corporate control mechanisms compared to the UK. Finally, 
the level of institutional ownership in the UK companies is considerably higher than it is in the US firms. 
Reference [13] discover that the institutional ownership of US companies is two-thirds the level of that in the 
UK. Furthermore, the US has the largest percentage of shareholders in the form of households. These 
institutional differences motivated this paper to examine the determinants CEO Turnover using the UK data. 
Our results suggest that poor performance and high financial leverage precede forced CEO Turnover. However, 
there is insignificant relationship between normal CEO Turnover and poor performance or high financial 
leverage. There is also strong evidence that forced top management change occurs mostly when the departing 
CEO holds a small amount of the firm’s equity. Furthermore, the results show that the market for corporate 
control complements internal control systems in disciplining poorly performing managers. 
2. Sample Construction 
The sample of CEO Turnover is constructed by examining all CEO Turnover announcements drawn from The 
Financial Times, reports from the UK Regulatory News Service provided by FT Extel News Reports, 
McCarthy’s News Information Service, Lexis-Nexis, and annual company reports. Initially, 1200 CEO Turnover 
events were collected from the above sources. However, the final sample satisfied the following three 
conditions: first, the firm should be a UK non-financial listed company. Second, only one announcement per 
firm per year was included in the sample. Third, the CEO should be the top officer of a company. These 
requirements produced a final sample of 705 CEO turnover events by 511 firms during the period 1993-2000. 
This data includes 394 (or 55.9%) forced CEO turnover and 311 (or 44.1%) normal CEO turnover events. The 
choice of the time period is limited by the requirement that at least 3 years of data be available before and after 
the CEO Turnover announcement period. Firms’ returns and accounting data were collected from Datastream. 
Turnover is labelled ‘forced’ when it was stated in an announcement that the CEO is leaving because of the 
following: fired, resigned, policy disagreement, failed acquisition and shake-ups, or when it was stated that the 
company was experiencing poor performance. On the other hand, the turnover is ‘normal’ when it was stated 
that that the CEO is leaving because of retirement, sickness or when taking a position elsewhere.2  
Table 1, panel A reports the distribution of a sample of UK non-financial firms that announced CEO Turnover 
over the period 1993-2000. Panel B reports the ownership characteristics of sample firms. It is apparent from 
this data that ‘forced’ CEOs had fewer stakes than ‘normal’ CEOs. 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that some announcements do not provide any reason for the departure of the CEO. In this 
case, the factors like age should be taken into consideration.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for CEO Turnover firms 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by years 
 
Year 
All changes Forced changes Normal changes 
N Fraction (%) N Fraction (%) N Fraction (%) 
1993 94 13.3 41 10.4 53 17.0 
1994 92 13.0 36 9.1 56 18.0 
1995 104 14.8 39 9.9 65 20.9 
1996 87 12.3 43 10.9 44 14.1 
1997 104 14.8 59 15.0 45 14.5 
1998 73 10.4 48 12.2 25 8.0 
1999 72 10.2 58 14.7 14 4.5 
2000 79 11.2 70 17.8 9 2.9 
Total 705 100.0 394 100.0 311 100.0 
Panel A: Ownership characteristics 
 
 
Variable 
Whole changes 
[N = 637] 
Forced CEO 
[N = 349] 
Normal CEO 
[N = 288] 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CEO ownership % 4.07 0.200 2.56 0.10 5.91 0.40 
Institutional holdings % 27.6 25.85 28.16 27.3 27.04 25.60 
Other directors’ ownership % 1.09 0.40 1.03 0.40 1.16 0.60 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for a sample of 705 UK non-financial firms that announced CEO 
Turnover during 1993-2000. Panel A reports the distribution of sample firms by years. Panel B reports the 
ownership characteristics of sample firms. Ownership characteristics are taken from annual reports and 
corporate registers while other financial information is taken from Datastream. Financial information is reported 
over the year prior to CEO Turnover. 
3. Empirical results 
This section reports results on the whole sample, forced and normal CEO Turnover sub-samples. However, the 
analysis of these results will focus mostly on forced and normal CEO changes.  Because of the influence of 
outliers on most of the results presented in this paper, the analysis will focus on medians [14]. 
3.1 Company Financial Characteristics Surrounding CEO Turnover  
In Table 2 the results on growth rates of unadjusted book assets, sales and the number of employees over the 
period prior to and after CEO Turnover are reported. The results indicate that the growth rate of these variables 
between years –3 and 0 was significantly positive for both sets of firms. However, the growth rate declines 
between years –1 and 0 relative to years –3 and 0; and forced CEO Turnover firms had larger declines for all 
variables. Furthermore, the results show that over the years following CEO changes, growth rates for all of these 
variables recover. For example, the growth rate of assets between years 0 and 3 is significantly positive at the 
1% level. The results of sales in the same period are positive, but insignificant for both sets of firms.  
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The number of employee results show that the growth rate of normal CEO Turnover increases significantly over 
the years following CEO Turnover, and that of forced CEO Turnover decreases significantly, except between 
the years 0 and 3. Collectively, these results suggest that forced CEO firms tend to grow with a reduced number 
of employees. 
Table 2: Median percentage changes in total assets, sales, and number of employees 
  Median percentage changes between years 
Sample N -3 and 0 -1 and 0 0 and 1 0 and 2 0 and 3 
Panel A: Book value of total assets 
All changes 685 19.65*  2.200*  2.750*  9.100*  19.15* 
Forced changes 377 16.75*  -0.750  1.000  5.700*  14.85* 
Routine changes 308 22.55*  5.250*  4.550*  12.50*  23.60*  
Panel B: Sales 
All changes 691 18.60*  2.950*  3.150*  4.500*  3.250 
Forced changes 382 13.65*  -0.250  1.000  -0.050  0.550  
Routine changes 309 23.70*  6.150*  5.550*  9.550*  6.100  
Panel C: Number of employees 
All changes 680 8.750*  0.450  -1.250**  -0.150  1.900  
Forced changes 374 9.150*  -0.700  -3.950*  -4.200**  -3.300  
Routine changes 306 8.250*  1.800**  1.550**  4.050**  7.650*  
 
The table reports median percentage changes in total assets, sales, and the number of employees for a sample of 
705 UK non-financial firms that announced CEO Turnover during the period 1993-2000. The significance of 
changes is measured using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
3.2 Operating Performance and Leverage over the Years Prior to CEO Turnover  
To assess whether a firm is performing unusually well or poorly, there is a need to specify the performance to be 
expected in the absence of an event in order to provide a benchmark against which sample firms can be 
compared. On this, two benchmarks were constructed and used: (i) the median industry, and (ii) control firms 
for measuring the expected operating performance.  
Industry-matching assumes that some of the cross-sectional variation in operating performance can be explained 
by an industry benchmark. A firm’s industry-adjusted performance is computed by subtracting the median 
performance of the industry comparison group from each firm’s performance.  
Table 3 reports industry-adjusted changes in ROA and indebtedness over the 3 years prior to CEO Turnover. 
Return on assets (ROA) is defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) for 
the financial year divided the book value of assets. Indebtedness is measured on the basis of the firm’s debt-to-
assets ratio and the interest coverage ratio. Debt-to-assets is defined as the ratio of the book value of total debt 
divided by the book value of assets. Interest coverage is measured as the ratio of pre-tax operating income 
before interest divided by the firm’s reported interest charge.  
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It is found that firms that announced forced CEO Turnover experienced poor performance over three years prior 
to CEO Turnover. The results are statistically significant at the 1% level. For normal CEO changes, the 
industry-adjusted change in ROA is insignificant in the whole period of analysis. This finding suggests that poor 
performance precedes forced CEO Turnover, and is consistent with that of the previous studies [3]. 
The results of both two metrics used to measure indebtedness show that the forced CEO Turnover sub-sample 
had a poor financial position over the 3 years prior to CEO Turnover. These results are statistically significant, 
mostly at the 1% level. This finding, which is consistent with that of [4], suggests that financial leverage also 
motivates corporate control systems to replace poorly performing managers [8]. The picture is different when 
the financial leverage for the normal CEO Turnover sub-sample is analysed. None of the two metrics is 
significant at conventional levels.  
Table 3:  Operating performance and financial leverage over the years prior to CEO Turnover 
 
Panel A: All Changes 
 Window N ROA Debt ratio Interest coverage 
Δ-3 TO 0 659 -0.0470* [-0.0275*]  0.0284* [0.0240*] -5.08** [-2.42*] 
Δ-2 TO 0 668 -0.0313*** [-0.0210*] 0.0191* [0.0165*] -1.51 [-1.780*] 
Δ-1 TO 0 681 -0.0195 [-0.0125*] 0.0075*** [0.0070**] -0.69 [-0.825*] 
Panel B: Forced changes 
Δ-3 TO 0 358 -0.0985* [-0.0570*] 0.0407* [0.0380*]  -11.86* [-4.705*] 
Δ-2 TO 0 362 -0.0775* [-0.0525*] 0.0295* [0.0305*] -5.74** [-3.763*] 
Δ-1 TO 0 375 -0.0551* [-0.0315*] 0.0104 [0.0115*] -4.73** [-2.010*] 
Panel C: Normal changes 
Window N ROA Debt ratio Interest coverage 
Δ-3 TO 0 302 0.0138 [-0.0035] 0.0168* [0.0100**] 2.99 [-0.0800] 
Δ-2 TO 0 306 0.0238 [0.0030] 0.0081 [0.0035] 3.51 [0.0500] 
Δ-1 TO 0 306 0.0244 [0.0025] 0.0044 [0.0030] 4.22 [0.1500] 
 
This table reports mean [median] changes in the industry-adjusted ROA, debt ratio, and interest coverage ratio 
for a sample of 705 UK non-financial firms that announced CEO changes during the period 1993-2000. Panel A 
reports results for all CEO Turnover. Panel B reports results for the forced sub-sample. Panel C reports results 
for normal CEO changes. ROA is defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
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(EBITDA), divided by total assets. Debt ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Interest coverage ratio is 
defined as the ratio of pre-tax profit, plus total interest charges to total interest charges. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. One drawback in using the level of an industry 
comparison group to measure expected performance (without any pre-event performance matching) is that it 
ignores the history of the firm relative to the benchmark. To circumvent this problem, a benchmark constructed 
on the basis of matching firms is used. 
3.3  Univariate Analysis of Sample and Control Firms  
To measure performance relative to matching firms, a matching firm is constructed on the basis of industry and 
pre-event performance. More specifically, a firm is selected as a control firm3 if it is from the same industry and 
with ROA within +/- 10% of the sample firm’s performance at the end of the year, prior to any announcement of 
CEO Turnover. Unlike industry-matching, the control firms help to control for mean reversion in earnings [14]. 
In Table 4 the sample firms are compared with control firms along a number of different dimensions underlying 
the top management change decision. In addition to ROA and financial leverage explained earlier, the business 
focus is measured by the number of different lines of business the firm reports and the sales-based Herfindahl 
index, H. H is calculated across n business segments as the sum of the squares of each segment i’s sales, Si, as a 
proportion of total assets. It takes values between zero and one. The closer H is to one, the more concentrated 
are the firm’s sales within a few of its segments, and hence the more focused its operations. 
Since the control firm selection criterion is based upon the same pre-event performance, naturally there is an 
insignificant difference in ROA between the sample and control firms. On a firm’s financial position, the results 
show that sample firms have more financial leverage than control firms, with the median difference significant 
at the 1% level. This result is similar across almost all measures of financial leverage used in this paper.  
The results also show that sample firms were less focused than control firms. Both sets of firms have more lines 
of business than control firms, with a median difference of 0.5 lines of business. The results on the Herfindahl 
indexes also support this finding. Collectively, the information in Table 3 suggests that those firms that changed 
top management were more diversified, and had more financial leverage than a sample of control firms with 
similar performance at the financial year prior to CEO Turnover. The table reports the mean [median] for 
selected financial variables at the financial-end prior to announcements of CEO Turnover for a sample of 705 
UK non-financial firms that announced CEO Turnover during the period 1993-2000. Panel A reports results for 
all CEO Turnover. Panel B reports results for the forced sub-sample. Panel C reports results for normal CEO 
changes. ROA is defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, divided by total assets. 
Debt ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Interest coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of pre-tax profit, 
plus total interest charges to total interest charges. The number of segments relates to the number of reported 3-
digit SIC lines of business that our sample firms operated in. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of 
segments’ sales squared divided by total sales squared, where sales are defined as the 3-digit SIC level. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
                                                 
3 Control firms are firms that are not sample firms.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for sample versus control firms in the pre-CEO Turnover year 
Panel A: All changes 
Variable Sample firms Control firms Differences 
Observations 705 705 705 
ROA 0.0828* [0.1175*] 0.0862* [0.1185*] -0.004 [-0.000] 
Debt ratio 0.401** [0.204*] 0.188* [0.165*] 0.214 [0.037*] 
Interest coverage 13.57* [4.855*] 98.8* [6.415*] -86.0** [-1.415*] 
Number of segments 2.113* [2.000*] 1.646* [1.500*] 0.489* [0.500*] 
Herfindahl index 0.720* [0.742*] 0.761* [0.772*] -0.043* [-0.033*] 
Panel B: Forced changes 
Observations 394 394 394 
ROA 0.0648* [0.1095*] 0.0716* [0.1110*] -0.008 [0.000] 
Debt ratio 0.563*** [0.219*] 0.201* [0.178*] 0.364 [0.044*] 
Interest coverage 14.70* [4.275*] 110.2 [5.730*] -97.0 [-1.140**] 
Number of segments 2.148* [2.000*] 1.622* [1.500*] 0.557* [0.500*] 
Herfindahl index 0.714* [0.741*] 0.747* [0.759*] -0.033 [-0.029***] 
Panel C: Normal changes 
Variable Sample firms Control firms Differences 
Observations 311 311 311 
ROA 0.1059* [0.1270*] 0.1050* [0.1270*] 0.001 [0.000] 
Debt ratio 0.200* [0.187*] 0.172* [0.152*] 0.028** [0.031*] 
Interest coverage 12.15* [5.655*] 62.6* [7.230*] -50.3** [-1.750*] 
Number of segments 2.067* [2.000*] 1.680* [1.500*] 0.399* [0.500*] 
Herfindahl index 0.728* [0.744*] 0.778* [0.788*] -0.053** [-0.035**] 
 
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that forced CEO Turnover tend to be associated with a trend of 
poor performance and high financial leverage going back at least 3 years, rather than just with poor performance 
in the year immediately preceding forced CEO Turnover. In addition, there is no evidence that normal CEO 
Turnover is associated with poor performance or high financial leverage.  In the next section, whether these 
factors can jointly explain the CEO Turnover decision is investigated.  
3.4 Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of CEO Turnover 
It has been shown that the decision to replace a top manager is influenced mainly by poor operating 
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performance and the financial condition of a firm. In this section, these factors are examined within a 
multivariate setting, and logistic regressions are carried out to assess the likelihood of CEO Turnover. To 
investigate this, the following cross sectional model is used.  
CEO = α + β1∆ROA-1,0 + β2DEBT-1 + β3ICOV-1 + β4TKV0 + β5DSTRS0 + β6DR-1 + β7ODR-1 + β8INST-1 + 
β9SIZE-1 + ε                                 (1) 
where, the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes on a value of one for sample firms and zero for 
control firms. ∆ROA-1,0 is change in operating performance from year 1−  to year 0. DEBT-1 is debt ratio in 
year -1. ICOV-1 is interest coverage ratio in year -1. TKV0 is a binary variable set equal to one, where the 
company encountered takeover pressure over the 12 months prior to CEO changes, and zero otherwise. DSTRS0 
is a binary variable set equal to one, where the company encountered financial distress over the 12 months prior 
to CEO Turnover, and zero otherwise. DR-1 is the fractional ownership stakes of the departing managers. ODR-1 
is other directors’ ownership - the fractional ownership stakes of the firm’s directors. INST-1 is institutional 
holdings - the fraction of the firm’s shares held by institutions with a disclosable interest of greater than 3%. 
SIZE-1 is firm size - measured by the natural logarithm of the company’s market value of equity. All continuous 
variables are measured at the financial year-end prior to CEO Turnover. The logistic regression results are 
reported in Table 5. As would be expected, the decision to displace a top manager is negatively related to 
previous firm performance. This finding is consistent with much of the previous literature on top management 
turnover (Huson and his colleagues 2004). However, it is found that the relation between normal CEO Turnover 
and prior operating performance is insignificantly negative. The table reports results for Logit regressions of the 
determinants of CEO Turnover for a sample of 705 UK non-financial firms that announced CEO changes during 
the period 1993-2000. All variables are as defined earlier. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Model: CEO = α + ROA + DEBT + ICOV + TKV + DSTRS + DR + ODR + INST + SIZE + ε 
Table 5: Cross-sectional determinants of CEO Turnover 
Variable All changes Forced changes Normal changes 
Observations 1410 788 622 
Constant -0.9847* -1.0935* -0.9569* 
∆ROA -1,0 -1.1743* -1.5078* -0.5082 
DEBT-1 0.8208* 0.9032** 1.2030 
ICOV-1 -0.0033* -0.0037* -0.0029** 
TKV12 months 1.1075* 1.3310* 0.7707 
DSTRS12 months 0.9437* 0.4322 1.9104* 
DR-1 -0.8063 -3.007** 0.1756 
ODR-1 -0.7430 -1.335 -1.295 
INST-1 -0.3880 -0.2629 -0.5401 
SIZE-1 0.2656* 0.2782* 0.2621* 
Log-likelihood -665.7* -348.4* -309.2* 
It is also found that the likelihood of a forced CEO change is increasing as the level of financial leverage in the 
firm increases. The coefficients of debt ratio and interest coverage ratio are significant at the 5% level or higher 
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for the forced sub-sample. This finding is consistent with that of [4], who reveals a high incidence of CEO 
Turnover following financial distress. In addition, theoretical evidence also shows that creditors often insist on 
the replacement of managers as a condition for restructuring firms with high financial leverage [15]. For the 
normal CEO change, however, it is only the coefficient of interest coverage ratio which is statistically different 
from zero. On market disciplinary variables, it is found that takeover pressure is positively related to the 
likelihood of forced CEO Turnover. This is consistent with the view that the market for corporate control plays 
an important role in disciplining poorly performing managers (Fama, 1980). The relation between takeover 
pressure and normal CEO changes is insignificantly positive. It is interesting to note that financial distress is 
insignificantly related to the forced CEO change, but is significantly and positively related to the normal CEO 
change. This finding, together with a significant negative relation between interest coverage ratio and normal 
CEO Turnover, suggests that financial distress accelerates normal CEO changes. On whether managerial 
ownership insulates managers from being replaced, it is found that a director’s ownership is significantly and 
negatively related to the likelihood of forced CEO Turnover, and this relationship is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. However, the coefficient for normal CEO changes is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 
coefficient of director’s ownership for forced CEO changes remains unchanged even after controlling for two 
more ownership variables, namely, other directors’ ownership and institutional holdings.4 The results also 
remain unchanged for normal CEO change. None of the coefficients of other directors’ ownership and 
institutional holdings is significant for both sets of firms. These results suggest that the ownership structure of a 
firm plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of internal managerial control mechanisms. This 
finding, which is consistent with that of [16], suggests that CEO Turnover occurs more frequently in UK firms 
in which CEOs own fewer stakes in the firm’s shares. Overall, the logistic results reinforce the earlier findings 
that forced CEO Turnover is preceded by poor performance and high financial leverage. In addition, the results 
show that forced CEO Turnover occurs mostly when the departing CEO holds a small amount of the firm’s 
equity. Furthermore, the results show that the market for corporate control complements internal control systems 
in disciplining poorly performing managers. 
4. Summary and conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the factors that determine CEO turnover. Specifically, the paper 
investigated the factors that potentially lead to CEO Turnover. The paper also examined whether control 
mechanisms (both internal and external) are effective enough on disciplining poorly performing corporate 
managers. The paper has contributed to research that examines the financial performance and corporate 
governance surrounding CEO Turnover. Using a sample of 705 CEO Turnover announcements for a sample of 
UK non-financial firms during the 1993-2000 period, evidence is presented of substantial poor performance and 
high financial leverage prior to forced Turnover. Firms that experienced normal CEO Turnover did not exhibit 
poor performance or high financial leverage prior to CEO Turnover. There is also strong evidence that forced 
top management change occurs mostly when the departing CEO holds a small amount of the firm’s equity. 
Furthermore, the results show that the market for corporate control complements internal control systems in 
disciplining poorly performing managers. The findings of this study are very important to the emerging markets. 
                                                 
4 As the results do not change significantly, only one model for each sub-sample is reported. 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2018) Volume 38, No  2, pp 13-23 
23 
 
For example, in Africa there is an endless list of poor performing companies but there is a rare chance that 
managers will ever be forced out of their offices because of poor performance. Does this suggest that these 
managers are entrenched and/or internal and external control mechanisms are blunt in Africa? The future 
research will address this question. 
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